

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEAMFITTERS LOCAL 449 PENSION
& RETIREMENT SECURITY FUNDS, on
Behalf of Itself and All Others Similarly
Situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

EXTREME NETWORKS, INC., EDWARD
B. MEYERCORD III, RÉMI THOMAS,
CRISTINA TATE, KEVIN RHODES,
NORMAN RICE, JONAS BROWN,

Defendants.

Case No. 24-cv-05102-TLT

**ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
GRANTING-IN-PART REQUEST FOR
JUDICIAL NOTICE AND
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE**

Re: Dkt. Nos. 104, 105, 131

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendants Extreme Networks, Inc. (“Extreme”), Edward B. Meyercord III, Rémi Thomas, Cristina Tate, Kevin Rhodes, Norman Rice, and Jonas Brown (collectively, “Defendants”)’s motion to dismiss Lead Plaintiffs Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and Retirement System (“Oklahoma Fire”), Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement System (“Oklahoma Police”), Oakland County Voluntary Employees’ Beneficiary Association (“Oakland County VEBA”), and Oakland County Employees’ Retirement System (“Oakland County ERS”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)’s SAC. ECF 104. Defendants also request judicial notice and incorporation by reference of 21 selected exhibits in support of their motion to dismiss. ECF 105. This is a federal securities class action brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s rule (“Rule”).

In the SAC, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants made false and misleading statements about Extreme’s product revenue and backlog between July 27, 2022, and January 30, 2024 (the “Class

1 Period”). ECF 95. The Class includes all persons and entities who purchased or acquired the
2 publicly traded common stock of Extreme during the Class Period and suffered damages thereby.
3 *Id.* at 1.

4 After reviewing the parties’ briefs, hearings, and the relevant legal authority, and for the
5 reasons below, the Court **DENIES** the motion to dismiss and **GRANTS** judicial notice as to the
6 existence of selected exhibits.

7 **II. BACKGROUND**

8 **A. Procedural background**

9 On August 13, 2024, Plaintiff Steamfitters Local 449 Pension & Retirement Security
10 Funds filed a federal securities class action against Defendants. ECF 1. On December 30, 2025,
11 the Court granted the unopposed motion to appoint lead plaintiff and lead counsel, appointing
12 Oklahoma Fire, Oklahoma Police, Oakland County VEBA, and Oakland County ERS as lead
13 plaintiffs. ECF 51.

14 On February 14, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the FAC against Defendant Extreme and its key
15 officers and high-level executives: (i) Chief Executive Officer Edward B. Meyercord III; (ii) Chief
16 Financial Officers (“CFO”) Rémi Thomas (who was the CFO until February 2023), Christina Tate
17 (who was the CFO from February 2023 to May 2023), and Kevin Rhodes (who was the CFO from
18 May 2023 until the end of the Class Period); (iii) Chief Operating Officer Norman Rice; and (iv)
19 Senior Director of Worldwide Distribution Sales and Strategy Jonas Brown. ECF 59. Plaintiffs
20 allege that Defendants have violated (1) Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5(b)
21 promulgated thereunder, (2) Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)
22 promulgated thereunder, and (3) Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. *Id.* ¶¶ 559–85.

23 On April 15, 2025, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the FAC and requested judicial
24 notice of the selected exhibits. ECF 74, 75. After being fully briefed, the Court granted the
25 motion to dismiss the FAC as to all claims, with leave to amend, because Plaintiffs failed to allege
26 the requisite manipulative sales practices and falsity with particularity as to the channel stuffing
27 and backlog schemes. ECF 92 (“Order”). The Court also granted judicial notice of the exhibits
28 for their existence, not for the truth of the matters asserted therein. *Id.*

1 On September 9, 2025, Plaintiffs timely filed the SAC. ECF 95. On October 3, 2025,
2 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the SAC and requested judicial notice of 21 exhibits. ECF
3 104, 105. On November 3, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss and a
4 response to the request for judicial notice. ECF 108, 109. On November 25, 2025, Defendants
5 filed a reply in support of the motion to dismiss and a response in support of the requests for
6 judicial notice, ECF 110, 111. The Court heard oral argument on March 3, 2026.

7 **B. Factual background**

8 For the purpose of resolving the present motion, the Court accepts the following
9 allegations in the SAC as true. ECF 95.

10 **i. Overview of the parties**

11 Lead Plaintiffs Oklahoma Fire, Oklahoma Police, Oakland County VEBA, and Oakland
12 County ERS bring this action individually and on behalf of all persons or entities who purchased
13 or otherwise acquired securities of Extreme during the Class Period (i.e., July 27, 2022, through
14 January 30, 2024). ECF 95 at 1.

15 Defendant Extreme Networks Inc. is a public corporation and global provider of cloud-
16 based computer networking equipment and related services. *Id.* ¶¶ 35, 56. Extreme develops,
17 manufactures, and sells wired and wireless network infrastructure hardware equipment. *Id.* ¶ 56.
18 Extreme reports its revenues by two major channels: (1) the direct channel refers to Extreme
19 selling its products directly to end user customers; and (2) the distributor channel refers to
20 Extreme selling its products to end users through (a) its distributors or (b) its partners/resellers. *Id.*
21 ¶ 60.

22 Revenues through the distributor channel were 85 percent of total product revenues for
23 FY2024, 83 percent of total product revenues for FY2023, and 80 percent of total product
24 revenues for FY2022. *Id.* ¶ 61. Its three largest distributors were TD Synnex Corporation (“TD
25 Synnex”), Jenne Inc. (“Jenne”), and Westcon Group Inc. (“Westcon”) with ScanSource, Inc.
26 (“ScanSource”), right behind them. *Id.* ¶ 62. The top three distributors accounted for over 54
27 percent, 53 percent, and 59 percent of total Extreme revenues in FY2022, FY2023, and FY2024,
28 respectively. *Id.* ¶ 63.

1 During the Class Period, Extreme recognized product revenue upon shipment to its
2 customers. *Id.* ¶ 64. In addition, Extreme reported backlog as a key metric and projected the
3 revenue based on the present number of “confirmed orders with a purchase order for products to
4 be fulfilled and billed to customers with approved credit status.” *Id.* ¶ 65. Defendants repeatedly
5 impressed the market that “the backlog effectively represented near-certain incoming revenue.”
6 *Id.*

7 The individual Defendants are key officers and high-level executives of Extreme during
8 the Class Period. *Id.* ¶¶ 36–42. These Defendants “participated in the management of Extreme,
9 had direct and supervisory involvement in Extreme’s day-to-day operations, and had the ability to
10 control and did control Extreme’s statements to investors.” *Id.* ¶ 42.

11 **ii. Confidential witnesses**

12 Plaintiffs rely on eleven confidential witnesses to corroborate their allegations. Each
13 confidential witness is a former employee (“FE”) of Extreme.

14 FE-1 was a Senior Distribution Account Manager at Extreme from May 2016 through
15 August 2022 and has been in the distribution business for over thirty years. *Id.* ¶ 45. At Extreme,
16 FE-1 managed the Company’s relationship with TD Synnex. *Id.* FE-1 reported to the Director of
17 Distribution in the Americas, Joe Uraco, who in turn, reported to Defendant Brown. *Id.* FE-1
18 worked with Defendant Brown on a daily basis. *Id.*

19 FE-2 was the Director of Sales from before the Class Period to mid-2023. *Id.* ¶ 46.
20 Thereafter, FE-2 was an Account Executive until the end of his tenure at Extreme. *Id.* As
21 Director of Sales, FE-2 reported to David Savage, who in turn reported to SVP Sales, Americas,
22 Pete Brant, who in turn reported to Defendant Rice. *Id.* In his capacity as Director of Sales, FE-2
23 was responsible for collaborating with end user State, Local and Education (“SLED”) accounts,
24 including universities, and the channel partners that sold to them, as well as working with
25 Extreme’s relevant distributors. *Id.*

26 FE-3 was a Senior-level Manager of pricing at Extreme from before the Class Period to the
27 second half of 2023. *Id.* ¶ 47. FE-3’s responsibilities included executing the rollout of pricing and
28 signing off on deals. *Id.* FE-3 reported to the Finance leadership of Defendant Tate, who reported

1 to the CFO at Extreme. *Id.*

2 FE-4 was employed by Extreme until December 2022, most recently serving as Senior
3 Regional Distribution Manager operating out of Europe. *Id.* ¶ 48. FE-4 worked directly with
4 distributor Westcon during his employment with Extreme. *Id.*

5 FE-5 was formerly employed by Extreme as Senior Channel Account Manager from
6 March 2022 to April 2024. *Id.* ¶ 49. FE-5’s responsibilities included collaborating with
7 Extreme’s two largest nationwide channel partners. *Id.* FE-5 reported to Channel Sales Manager
8 – Strategic Partnerships, Matthew Kilianski, and then Director, Global Solution Partnerships –
9 Americas, Amy Bravo, and lastly Director – Strategic Partnerships, Cameron Marchand. *Id.*
10 According to FE-5, Kilianski, Bravo, and Marchand reported to Vice President, Americas
11 Channel, Jennifer Orr, who ultimately reported to Defendant Meyercord. *Id.*

12 FE-6 was a Senior Account Manager at Extreme from July 2017 to October 2022. *Id.* ¶ 50.
13 During different points during his tenure at Extreme, FE-6 reported to either David Savage or to
14 FE-2. *Id.* FE-6 worked as part of the SLED department, and except for the K-12 segment of
15 SLED, he worked with distributors and partners throughout his tenure. *Id.*

16 FE-7 was the former President of a company, Intovista, that was acquired by Extreme in
17 2021. *Id.* ¶ 51. FE-7 began working for Extreme in August 2021, as the sale was underway, and
18 formally became an Extreme employee in March 2022. *Id.* FE-7 attended and participated in
19 quarterly and monthly Executive Leadership Team meetings in or around August 2021, where
20 Defendants Meyercord, Thomas, Rice, Joe Vitalone, and others attended. *Id.* FE-7 explained that
21 he was formally employed as the SVP, Strategy, Office of the CTO from March 2022 until March
22 2023. *Id.* FE-7 reported to the current Chief Technology and Product Officer, EVP/GM
23 Subscription Business, Nabil Bukhari. *Id.* FE-7 was tasked with analyzing several aspects of
24 Extreme’s business, including examining the pricing strategy for Extreme’s entire product
25 portfolio. *Id.*

26 FE-8 was employed by Extreme as SVP Global Channel Sales from January 2022 to
27 November 2023. *Id.* ¶ 52. The Distribution teams reported to FE-8. *Id.* FE-8 attended “Revenue
28 Assurance” calls led by Defendant Rice, where the Company’s backlog was discussed. *Id.*

1 FE-9 was employed by Extreme as a Channel Account Manager starting before the Class
2 Period, until late 2023. *Id.* ¶ 53. According to FE-9, he was part of a team of employees managing
3 the account and relationship with one of Extreme’s largest resellers/partners during the Class
4 Period. *Id.*

5 FE-10 was employed by Extreme as a Senior Account Executive from July 2023 until
6 April 2024 and was responsible for accounts in North America. *Id.* ¶ 54.

7 FE-11 was employed by Extreme as an Account Manager from Fall 2022 through the end
8 of the Class Period in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa (“EMEA”) region. *Id.* ¶ 55. He was
9 responsible for ensuring that partner accounts were set up correctly and received the correct
10 discounts from Extreme’s distributors, resolving any conflicts with end users, and working closely
11 with team members in EMEA who worked directly with the partner accounts. *Id.*

12 **iii. Extreme’s revenues grew despite COVID-19’s impact on backlog.**

13 Extreme’s products rely on several key components, such as merchant silicon,
14 microprocessors, integrated circuits, and power supplies. *Id.* ¶ 66. The COVID-19 pandemic,
15 which first emerged in 2020, created disruptions and bottlenecks that led to a shortage of
16 Extreme’s supply of networking products in the subsequent years. *Id.* The impact of the
17 pandemic was imminent on Extreme’s revenues. *Id.* ¶ 67. Analysts began to grow concerned
18 about Extreme’s ability to deliver products and generate revenue during this constrained supply
19 chain environment. *Id.* ¶ 68. These supply chain constraints led to a large and significant increase
20 in Extreme’s backlog of orders. *Id.* ¶ 69. Extreme’s backlog grew from approximately \$100
21 million in 4Q2021 to a high of \$555 million in 1Q2023. *Id.* During the same time frame, Extreme
22 nonetheless reported strong revenue growth. *Id.* ¶ 81. Extreme attributed its revenue growth to
23 “exceptionally strong demand.” *Id.* ¶ 87. Revenues peaked in 4Q2023 but then declined
24 significantly in 2Q2024. *Id.* ¶¶ 86, 93.

25 **iv. Channel stuffing and other manipulative sales and inventory tactics**

26 In March 2022, facing revenue shortfalls, Defendants initiated a scheme to manufacture
27 demand to meet market expectations. *Id.* ¶ 7. This new system functioned as “extortion,” in
28 which distributors or partners desperate for in-demand backlog products were forced to purchase

1 massive quantities of unneeded, at times obsolete, inventory in exchange for priority shipments.
2 *Id.* ¶ 9. Defendant Meyercord authorized a plan to “blow up” Extreme’s “first-in, first-out”
3 (“FIFO”) backlog allocation system because Extreme was “running out of tricks” to meet
4 quarterly numbers. *Id.* ¶ 8. If they refused, competitors who “played ball” would jump ahead in
5 the delivery line. *Id.* ¶ 9. Specific instances of this conduct were identified across Extreme’s
6 distributors and partners through Extreme’s FEs.

7 For instance, in March 2022, Jenne and Westcon agreed to purchase \$40 million of
8 Extreme’s unneeded inventory to move up in line for Extreme’s new product. *Id.* ¶ 123. Between
9 April and June 2022, Westcon was coerced into a transaction in which it purchased \$52 million in
10 “end of sale” junk cables, brackets, and fans that “nobody wanted” in exchange for \$50 million in
11 backlogged products its customers actually needed. *Id.* ¶¶ 10, 125–34. Jenne agreed to a deal
12 similar to WestCon’s, valued at \$40 to \$50 million, to enable Extreme to meet its 4Q2022 and
13 FY2022 revenue targets. *Id.* ¶ 137. In Summer 2022, Extreme’s partner was incentivized by
14 Extreme to make a \$500,000 deal in exchange for discounts on future orders without any purchase
15 order. *Id.* ¶ 226–27. TD Synnex had its inventory balloon from 28 days to 100-200 days of
16 supply within months because it was forced to buy product it did not need to “keep its place in
17 line” in the backlog. *Id.* ¶ 11, 156. Smaller distributors or partners were similarly coerced. In
18 June 2023, PC Solutions and Synergetics were forced to take \$1.5 million and \$700,000 worth of
19 product for school districts, respectively, without customer orders, to help Extreme at the close of
20 fiscal year 2023. *Id.* ¶ 12, 207–21. To sustain this scheme, Defendants sought to prevent the
21 return or rotation of the inventory by threatening to bar distributors from re-ordering products for
22 12 months. *Id.* ¶ 11, 172, 176. Defendants never disclosed this coercion, instead telling investors
23 that it was “exceptionally strong” and “unabated” demand driving Extreme’s steady drumbeat of
24 increasing product revenues during the Class Period. *Id.* ¶ 12. As a result of these practices,
25 Defendants’ reported revenues were improperly inflated. *Id.* ¶ 249.

26 Defendants knew the backlog was contractually designed to be cancelled and consisted of
27 phantom orders that would vanish once competitors delivered first. *Id.* ¶¶ 3, 16. The internal
28 investigations by FE-7 confirmed that up to 66% of the backlog consisted of phantom orders

1 placed simultaneously by multiple competitors. *Id.* While publicly claiming a one percent
 2 cancellation rate, Defendants internally hedged for a 10 percent rate. *Id.* ¶¶ 15, 602. This conduct
 3 was exposed in August 2023 when the backlog fell by \$170 million in a single quarter, while
 4 revenues grew by only \$21 million, indicating that \$149 million in firm orders had simply
 5 vanished. *Id.* ¶ 18, 19

6 **v. Challenged growth and demand Statements and backlog Statements**

7 During the Class Period, Defendants allegedly made false and misleading growth and
 8 demand statements to the market that “Extreme’s revenue growth was attributable to organic and
 9 exceptionally strong demand for the Company’s products” while masking the implementation of
 10 an extensive channel-stuffing scheme. *Id.* ¶¶ 388–487; *see generally* ECF 95-1 statements 1–54
 11 (“Statements”). These tactics allegedly included shipping products to partners without firm
 12 purchase orders, forcing distributors to buy unneeded inventory to maintain backlog priority, and
 13 preventing contractual returns to hide the true state of customer demand. ECF 95 ¶ 390.

14 Moreover, Defendants assured investors that Extreme’s ballooning backlog, which peaked
 15 at \$555 million, was “firm,” “high quality,” and “not cancelable.” *Id.* ¶¶ 3, 269, 332, 402–03, 425;
 16 *see generally* Statements. Defendants publicly assured investors of “complete visibility” and
 17 “negligible cancellations,” that is, less than one percent of bookings, and said they saw no
 18 evidence of “double ordering.” ECF 95 ¶¶ 3, 16, 72, 79, 331, 269, 388–487, 510, 621.

19 **vi. Additional allegations of scienter**

20 The FEs explained that Defendants directly orchestrated and monitored the manipulative
 21 sales tactics on 16 grounds. *Id.* ¶¶ 94–118, 120–23, 129–35, 183–87, 206, 222–48, 274–91, 306–
 22 28, 487–562, 572–614. For example, according to the FE-1’s contemporaneous note, Defendant
 23 Meyercord “chose this path—lesser of the 2 evils” to “blow up” the Company’s FIFO backlog
 24 allocation system because the Company was “running out of tricks in our bag” to meet quarterly
 25 numbers. *Id.* ¶ 115. Several FEs explained that Defendants monitored end-user sales through the
 26 Clari and Salesforce databases, knowing that products were being shipped without confirmed end-
 27 user orders. *Id.* ¶¶ 229–48, 526–31. FE-3 and FE-1 further revealed that the backlog was not
 28 “firm” because Extreme lacked “back-to-back” purchase orders from end users, leading to

1 widespread double-booking and phantom demand. *Id.* ¶¶ 307–13. Despite being warned by FE-3
 2 of this lack of visibility, Defendant Thomas refused to implement commitment-securing clauses to
 3 avoid internal restructuring and Defendants Rice and Brown refused to cancel backlog orders to
 4 inflate backlog metrics. *Id.* ¶¶ 310, 314. Also, FE-1 directly informed Defendant Thomas of the
 5 unethical channel stuffing and suppressed stock rotations during FE-1’s exit interview in July
 6 2022. *Id.* ¶¶ 183–87. Similarly, FE-7 warned the Executive Leadership Team in Summer 2022,
 7 including Defendants Meyercord, Thomas, and Rice, that the Extreme’s reported backlog
 8 portrayals conflicted with established industry practice. *Id.* ¶¶ 601–07. FE-1 observed that
 9 Defendant Brown repeatedly refused to document “side deals” with TD Synnex, insisting on
 10 verbal-only agreements, stating that “auditors will be all over us” if the conversion rates spiked.
 11 *Id.* ¶¶ 118, 177, 501, 597. The FE-2, FE-10, and FE-11, who refused to implement the
 12 manipulative sales tactics, were subjected to demotions or belligerent pressure from management.
 13 *Id.* ¶¶ 222–28, 584–95.

14 III. LEGAL STANDARD

15 A. Rule 12(b)(6)

16 Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which
 17 relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To overcome a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s
 18 “factual allegations [in the complaint] ‘must . . . suggest that the claim has at least a plausible
 19 chance of success.’” *Levitt v. Yelp! Inc.*, 765 F.3d 1123, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing *Ashcroft v.*
 20 *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). “A claim
 21 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
 22 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at
 23 678 (citing *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). The court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint
 24 as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
 25 *Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.*, 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). However,
 26 “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to avoid a Rule
 27 12(b)(6) dismissal.” *Cousins v. Lockyer*, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).

B. Rule 9(b) and PSLRA

1 At the pleading stage, “[s]ecurities fraud class actions must meet the higher, more exacting
2 pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation
3 Reform Act.” *Or. Pub. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Apollo Grp. Inc.*, 774 F.3d 598, 604 (9th Cir. 2014).
4 Under the PSLRA, plaintiffs are required to “plead with particularity both falsity and scienter.”
5 *Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp.*, 552 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009), as amended (Feb. 10,
6 2009) (citations omitted); see *Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. of Greater St. Louis v. Funko Inc*, No.
7 24-4909, 2026 WL 292424, at *8 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2026).

8 “A plaintiff asserting a claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must allege “(1) a
9 material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant [(“falsity”)]; (2) scienter; (3) a connection
10 between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon
11 the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”” *Constr. Laborers*
12 *Pension Tr. of Greater St. Louis v. Funko Inc*, 166 F.4th 805, 821 (9th Cir. 2026) (citing *Glazer*
13 *Cap. Mgmt., L.P. v. Forescout Techs., Inc.*, 63 F.4th 747, 764 (9th Cir. 2023). “Section 20(a)
14 imposes liability on a person who is in control of the person who is directly responsible for a
15 securities fraud violation.” *In re Alphabet, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 1 F.4th 687, 701–02 (9th Cir. 2021).
16 Section 20(a) claims are derivative and require an underlying violation of the statute. *Id.* (quoting
17 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)).

18 To properly plead falsity, the complaint must “specify each statement alleged to have been
19 misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding
20 the statement or omission is made on information and belief, . . . state with particularity all facts
21 on which that belief is formed.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(1). There is “no requirement that Plaintiffs
22 allege actual knowledge of the risk disclosure’s falsity to get their claims past dismissal on the
23 falsity element.” *Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. of Greater St. Louis v. Funko Inc*, No. 24-4909,
24 2026 WL 292424, at *14 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2026). “[T]he relevant question is whether the
25 allegations in the complaint allow for the reasonable inference that risk disclosures “created an
26 impression of a state of affairs that differed in a material way from the one that actually existed.”
27 *Id.* (quoting *Facebook, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 87 F.4th 934, 948 (9th Cir. 2023); *Brody v. Transitional*
28

1 *Hosps. Corp.*, 280 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002)).

2 To properly plead scienter, the complaint must also “state with particularity facts giving
3 rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.” 15 U.S.C. §
4 78u–4(b)(2). Whether the allegations meet the strong inference standard requires a two-step
5 inquiry. *See Funko Inc*, 2026 WL 292424, at *17. The first step asks whether “any of the
6 allegations, alone, are sufficient to give rise to a strong inference of scienter.” *Id.* (citing *Glazer*,
7 63 F.4th at 766; *Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp.*, 552 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2009), as
8 amended (Feb. 10, 2009)). If no individual allegations are sufficient, the court proceeds to the
9 next step of a holistic review, in which, when considered together, the allegations give rise to a
10 strong inference of scienter. *Id.* “Ultimately, [the Court is required] to assess allegations of
11 scienter holistically.” *Leventhal v. Chegg, Inc.*, 721 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2024),
12 reconsideration denied, No. 21-CV-09953-PCP, 2024 WL 3447516 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2024).

13 **IV. DISCUSSION**

14 **A. Requests for judicial notice or incorporation by reference**

15 Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of, or incorporate by reference, 21
16 exhibits that were previously considered and granted under either framework. ECF 92 at 9–12.
17 Defendants assert that “[e]ach of these exhibits [is] quoted from and/or [is] necessarily the source
18 of information Plaintiffs rely upon in support of their claims in this case.” ECF 105 at 6.
19 Defendants also contend that “Exhibits 4-11, 13-15, 17-19, and 21 are publicly available SEC
20 filings, press releases, or earnings call transcripts” and must be “incorporated by reference because
21 Plaintiffs quote these documents as sources of the challenged statements and alleged corrective
22 disclosures that are fundamental to Plaintiffs’ securities fraud claims.” *Id.* at 4. Plaintiffs do not
23 object to these exhibits for the limited purpose of establishing their existence, not for the truth of
24 the matters therein, or as an improper counternarrative to Plaintiffs’ allegations. ECF 108.
25 Defendants do not intend to create a counternarrative or factual dispute, but to the extent the Court
26 considers the exhibits in the appropriate context relative to Plaintiffs’ allegations. ECF 111.

27 “The [C]ourt may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because
28 it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately

1 and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R.
 2 Evid. 201(b). Alternatively, the Court may “consider materials that are submitted with and
 3 attached to the Complaint. [The Court] may also consider unattached evidence on which the
 4 complaint ‘necessarily relies’ if: (1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is
 5 central to the plaintiff’s claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the document.”
 6 *United States v. Corinthian Colls.*, 655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit has
 7 cautioned against the “unscrupulous use of extrinsic documents” under these exceptions, which
 8 “risks premature dismissals of plausible claims.” *Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc.*, 899 F.3d
 9 988, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2018).

10 Here, Exhibits 1, 4, 8, 9, 11, and 15 are publicly available transcripts of earnings calls.
 11 ECF 105 at 1–2. Exhibits 2, 6, 14, and 20 are Forms 10-K, and Exhibits 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 13, 16, 18,
 12 and 19 are Forms 8-K. *Id.*, at 1–3. Courts routinely take judicial notice of public SEC filings and
 13 publicly available transcripts of earnings calls—not to accept the entire contents of the documents
 14 as true, but to show what information was available to the market. *See Weston v. DocuSign, Inc.*,
 15 669 F. Supp. 3d 849, 872 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (taking judicial notice of earnings call transcripts,
 16 Forms 8-K and Forms 10-K to show representations made to the market only); *Pirani v. Netflix,*
 17 *Inc.*, 710 F. Supp. 3d 756, 767 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (“courts routinely take judicial notice of . . .
 18 documents filed with the SEC for the purpose of determining what information was available to
 19 the market”); *In re Splunk Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 592 F. Supp. 3d 919, 929–30 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (taking
 20 judicial notice of transcripts of calls with and presentations to analysts and investors); *Cement*
 21 *Masons & Plasterers Joint Pension Tr. v. Equinix, Inc.*, No. 11-01016 SC, 2012 WL 685344, at *8
 22 n.5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012) (taking judicial notice of the fact that a defendant actually sold more
 23 shares during the “six months preceding the class period”).

24 Next, Exhibit 17 is a publicly available CRN article. ECF 105 at 2. And Plaintiffs do not
 25 oppose its SAC, which relies on Exhibit 17. ECF 108. To the extent that the press releases form
 26 the basis for the Plaintiff’s claims, as incorporated by reference in the SAC, the Court takes
 27 judicial notice of the three press releases and the report only to the extent of acknowledging their
 28 existence in the public domain, the fact that such statements were made, but not for the truth of

1 their statements. *See Sanchez-Martinez v. Freitas*, No. 23-CV-02508-HSG, 2024 WL 4309277, at
2 *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2024) (“The Court takes judicial notice of the press release and the article
3 for the limited purposes of acknowledging the existence of these documents. But the Court does
4 not take judicial notice of the truth of the contents of these documents.”); *Von Saher v. Norton*
5 *Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena*, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Courts may take judicial
6 notice of publications introduced to indicate what was in the public realm at the time, not whether
7 the contents of those articles were in fact true.”); *Brodsky v. Yahoo! Inc.*, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1104,
8 1111–12 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (taking judicial notice of press releases, news articles, and analyst
9 reports referred to in the complaint, but not for the truth of their content).

10 Accordingly, the Court **GRANTS** judicial notice as to the existence of 21 Exhibits for the
11 purpose of determining what information was available to the market or the existence in the public
12 domain, not for the truth of any of the facts asserted.

13 **B. Falsity**

14 **i. The SAC alleges with particularized facts to demonstrate that growth and
15 demand Statements were false.**

16 Defendants argue that the SAC fails to cure deficiencies identified in the growth and
17 demand statements because Plaintiffs still rely on vague allegations from anonymous FEs. ECF
18 104 at 7. Specifically, Defendants point out that FE-1’s remixed testimony, combined with
19 previously undisclosed contemporaneous notes, to allege illicit channel stuffing is unreliable and
20 puzzling, given that Plaintiffs’ lead counsel possessed these notes in the FAC. *Id.* at 8. FE-2’s
21 allegation of a transaction with Synergetics lacks information about “when the deal was closed,
22 what incentives were offered, what the final price was, and whether the transaction artificially
23 inflated Extreme’s earnings.” *Id.* at 10–11. FE-4’s allegation is hearsay because he or his source
24 did not attend the dinner where the deal was allegedly discussed. *Id.* at 10. FE-11’s allegation is
25 also deficient for lack of transaction details beyond a vague timeline of summer 2022. *Id.* at 11.
26 Defendants also point out that the SAC failed to identify any actual instances of the customer’s
27 return or Defendants’ return refusals. *Id.* at 9.

28 The Court previously held that although part of FE-1’s accounts were reliable, FE-1

1 ultimately failed to provide specific, particularized allegations of channel stuffing because the
2 timeline was not clear and its allegations heavily relied on hearsay. ECF 92 at 17. In this Order,
3 the Court considers whether the SAC clarifies the FE-1’s timeline and the reliability of FE-1’s
4 personal knowledge on his allegations.

5 The SAC alleges that, according to FE-1, in March 2022, Defendant Brown launched an
6 initiative that forced distributors waiting for backlogged products to buy large amounts of “low- or
7 no-demand products” to maintain or move their place in the backlog. ECF 95 ¶ 101. FE-1’s
8 contemporaneous notes from the meeting on March 16, 2022, capture that Defendant Brown
9 asked, “how do we get into the company # that the street expects . . .”, stated that “FIFO would not
10 work” to meet expectations, and noted a plan to “decommit all”. *Id.* ¶¶ 106–15. FE-1’s note also
11 reflects that Brown stated the plan was the “lesser of many evils for ELT” and that Defendant
12 Meyercord specifically “chooses blowing up FIFO.” *Id.* ¶¶ 114–15.

13 Here, the Court finds that “[r]equiring more detail than those presently alleged [in the
14 SAC] would transform the PSLRA’s formidable pleading requirement into an impossible one.”
15 *See Glazer*, 63 F.4th at 769. First, the SAC clarifies the timeline of FE-1’s account, which is
16 mostly based on his personal knowledge, indicating the particularity of allegations. The SAC
17 cures the unclear timeline by anchoring the commencement of the illicit channel stuffing scheme
18 to the specific March 2022 meetings and contemporaneous notes that FE-1 personally witnessed.
19 ECF 95 ¶¶ 99–123. Moreover, the notes and communications with Defendants Brown, Rice,
20 Meyercord, and Thomas, whom FE-1 directly heard, as well as with Extreme’s distributors during
21 his tenure, particularize the SAC sufficiently to allege that illicit channel stuffing was occurring.
22 ECF 95 ¶¶ 99–123, 140, 146–57, 164–87.

23 These particularized allegations are consistent with two cases Plaintiffs cited in both their
24 previous and current briefs. Similar to *In re Plantronics, Inc. Securities Litigation*, where channel
25 stuffing was identified through internal accounts of manipulative sales tactics, FE-1’s notes
26 mention the presence of illegal channel stuffing, with those who complied receiving priority
27 shipments of desired inventory, whereas those who refused receiving reduced shipments of
28 inventory. No. 19-CV-07481-JST, 2022 WL 365333, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2022); ECF 95 ¶

1 152. Mirroring *Murphy v. Precision Castparts Corporation*, where channel stuffing was found
 2 through the internal pull-in sales policy, FE-1 describes that Extreme received weekly inventory-
 3 demand reports from its distributor and a pipeline report to determine what “true real demand”
 4 was but chose to push inventory to distributors that did not need it and did not allow them to
 5 cancel or return it. No. 3:16-CV-00521-SB, 2017 WL 3084274, at *3 (D. Or. June 27, 2017);
 6 ECF 95 ¶ 170–72. FE-1 further describes that “to maximize revenues and avoid detection,”
 7 Defendant Brown regularly reneged on the 15% stock rotation agreements, forcing a lower 5% cap
 8 or delaying rotations indefinitely to report inflated numbers. *Id.* ¶¶ 168–69.

9 Second, the SAC cures deficiencies identified in the previous order by providing specific
 10 timelines and transactions for other FEs. For instance, the SAC clarifies that FE-4 worked directly
 11 with Westcon and his account corroborated the \$102 million channel stuffing deal involving “end
 12 of sale” products in 4Q2022. *Id.* ¶¶ 131–36. The SAC also details communications and
 13 transactions from FE-2, including the coercion of PC Solutions and Synergetics to accept \$2.2
 14 million in product without end-user purchase orders to meet the FY2023 revenue target in June
 15 2023. *Id.* ¶¶ 207–21. FE-11 details a suspicious \$500,000 deal in Summer 2022, in which a
 16 partner was incentivized to purchase without a customer order. *Id.* ¶¶ 226–28.

17 Third, as to whether the revenue number is misleading, the Court previously held that
 18 Plaintiffs’ allegation will be sufficient to allege revenue number is misleading “[i]f Plaintiffs are
 19 able to provide more particularized allegations regarding manipulative sales practices toward
 20 Defendants’ largest distributors” including TD Synnex, Jenne, and Westcon. ECF 92 at 19. As
 21 stated above, the SAC provides more particularized allegations by describing Extreme’s alleged
 22 manipulative sales of \$40 to \$50 million to Jenne at the end of June 2022, the coercive \$102
 23 million Westcon deal involving \$52 million in unwanted inventory, and the systematic punishment
 24 of TD Synnex and ScanSource for refusing to “play ball” while forcing TD Synnex into
 25 compliance to meet quarterly targets. ECF 95 ¶¶ 131–38, 152–56.

26 Accordingly, the Court finds the SAC provides particularized details about the purported
 27 illicit channel stuffing scheme to render Defendants’ growth and demand statements false to
 28 survive the motion at this stage.

1 **ii. The SAC alleges with particularized facts to demonstrate that the backlog**
 2 **Statements were false.**

3 Defendants argue that the SAC still failed to allege backlog statements with particularity,
 4 contending that FE-1 lacks personal knowledge of the cancelled order in 2023, as he left before
 5 2023, and FE-2 relies on hearsay statements to support duplicative backlog orders without details.
 6 ECF 104 at 15. For FE-7, Defendants contend that its added timeline of meetings occurred
 7 between July and September 2022 only reflects a forward-looking assumption about a 10 percent
 8 internal cancellation hedge, rather than a contemporaneous fact contradicting the company’s
 9 historical reporting of actual cancellations at that time. *Id.* at 15–16. Defendants further contend
 10 that FE-7’s “acid test” is logically defective as it relies on hearsay statements from five executives
 11 who were not current customers of Extreme. *Id.* at 16–17. FE-7’s recollection of three important
 12 deals over \$5 million fails to identify the actual customers or provide evidence that any named
 13 Defendants knew of these deals or that the deals remained in Extreme’s backlog. *Id.* at 17.

14 Plaintiffs counter that the SAC demonstrates that Defendants had actual knowledge that
 15 backlog cancellations would exceed the touted “fraction of 1%” as early as July–September 2022.
 16 ECF 109 at 13. FE-7 attended monthly and quarterly ELT meetings with Defendants Meyercord,
 17 Thomas, Rice, and others, where the state of the business towards sales targets and potential
 18 bumps are always an element of discussion. ECF 95 ¶¶ 278–79. The ELT meeting in Summer
 19 2022 discussed a 10 percent cancellation hedge, a figure FE-7 informed Defendants was already
 20 “misleading” based on an “acid test” confirming that industry participants double-order and up to
 21 66 percent of the backlog would vanish once competitors delivered first. ECF 95 ¶¶ 278–90. This
 22 is corroborated by FE-5, who noted that double-ordering was “widely known” via the “Return
 23 Merchandise Authorization” process, and FE-3, who discussed these cancellations directly with
 24 Defendant Thomas. *Id.* ¶¶ 303–11, 318–19.

25 In the previous order, the Court found that while FE-1, FE-2, FE-3, FE-5, and FE-7’s
 26 accounts in FAC were reliable, they lacked the particularity largely because of generalized terms,
 27 missing details, and unclear timelines to demonstrate specific examples of customers’ double or
 28 triple bookings and the timing of when the cancellations occurred. ECF 92 at 20.

 The Court finds that the SAC cures these deficiencies by providing a concrete timeline and

1 corroborating contemporaneous details from multiple FEs who testify to the pervasive “double-
2 ordering” phenomenon that created an imminent risk that Extreme’s backlog would evaporate.
3 The FE-7’s accounts anchor the falsity to an ELT meeting between July and September 2022
4 where Defendants Meyercord, Thomas, and Rice openly discussed a 10 percent cancellation
5 hedge, directly contradicting their public assurances of negligible cancellations. ECF 95 ¶¶ 281–
6 84. The FE-3 directly warned Defendant Thomas regarding the lack of back-to-back purchase
7 orders. ECF 95 ¶¶ 307–11. Given the positions of FEs, such contemporaneous conversations are
8 detailed enough to meet a heightened, severe risk of backlog cancellations known to Defendants at
9 the time of their statements. *See Berson v. Applied Signal Tech., Inc.*, 527 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir.
10 2008) (finding the complaint alleged with particularity when a former employee is in a position to
11 reasonably infer the issuance of a stop-work order that creates a heightened risk of cancellation);
12 *Glazer*, 63 F.4th at 771 (crediting allegations of contemporaneous conversations that [FEs]
13 themselves heard).

14 Accordingly, the Court finds that the SAC provides particularized details sufficient to
15 render Defendants’ backlog statements misleading to survive the motion at this stage.

16 **iii. The challenged Statements suggest more than mild optimism and are**
17 **actionable.**

18 Defendants contest that most of the challenged Statements are general statements of
19 optimism and, therefore, constitute non-actionable puffery. ECF 104 at 12. Specifically,
20 Defendants argue that terms such as “strong” and “impressive” for Extreme’s growth and demand
21 are non-actionable feel-good monikers that do not affect investment decisions. *Id.* Additionally,
22 more emphatic terms like “exceptionally strong,” “unabated,” “record setting,” “double-digit
23 revenue growth,” and “unprecedented” are also non-actionable under *In Re Cutera Securities*
24 *Litigation*, 610 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2010). ECF 125 at 2.

25 The Court is not persuaded. While general statements of optimism are typically non-
26 actionable, they still may form a basis for an actionable securities fraud claim when taken in
27 context. *Glazer*, 63 F.4th at 770 (citing *Cutera*, 610 F.3d at 1111 and *Warshaw v. Xoma Corp.*, 74
28 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir. 1996)). In *Cutera*, the Ninth Circuit observed that mildly optimistic and

1 subjective terms like “good” and “well-regarded” are non-actionable because investors know
2 “how to devalue” such statements. 610 F.3d at 1111. For a similar reason, the Ninth Circuit
3 concluded that statements such as “we expect the second half [] to be stronger than the first half,”
4 “new products are coming in a wave, not in a trickle,” and “old products are doing very well” are
5 vague corporate optimism. *Id.* (citation omitted).

6 Here, the challenged Statements suggest more than a mild or vague optimistic nature. The
7 SAC alleges that during the Class Period, Defendants repeatedly reassured investors of “strong
8 growth” and “impressive double-digit revenues,” bolstered by “organic,” “exceptionally strong,”
9 and “unabated market demand,” while allegedly concealing an illicit channel stuffing or
10 manipulative sales practice. The FEs’ accounts, including FE-1’s contemporary note of Defendant
11 Brown’s statement for the need to “get into the company [the] # the street expects,” provide
12 granular details, suggesting that the challenged Statements were not merely non-actionable feel-
13 good monikers when taken in context. *Cf. In re Solarcity Corp. Securities Litigation*, 274 F. Supp.
14 3d 972, 994–1009 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (finding that “[d]emand remained as strong as ever,” “Q2 was
15 an amazing quarter,” “incredibly strong sales,” and “we very [sic] optimistic about our growth”
16 are non-actionable while finding no specific allegation that its confidential witness had personal
17 knowledge of officers or their states of minds regarding the operation of the company); *In re*
18 *SunPower Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 2018 WL 4904904, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2018) (“very strong
19 demand” was non-actionable when allegations failed to disclose why the company cannot
20 reasonably stay optimistic).

21 Accordingly, the Court finds that the challenged Statements are not non-actionable
22 statements of corporate optimism.

23 **iv. The PSLRA safe harbor does not shield challenged Statements.**

24 Defendants contend that the PSLRA’s safe harbor provision immunizes Defendants from
25 liability for the 22 growth and demand Statements Plaintiffs challenge because they are
26 categorically forward-looking. ECF 104 at 13–14. Defendants also contend that, similar to the
27 growth and demand Statements, the 23 backlog Statements Plaintiffs challenge are forward-
28 looking and protected under the PSLRA safe harbor, specifically because they included

1 meaningful cautionary language that warned that customers could cancel orders, which would
2 impact the accuracy of revenue forecasts, and also warned against other scenarios, such as
3 rescheduling or canceling orders. *Id.* at 17–18. Concurrently, Defendants claim that because
4 Plaintiffs have failed to allege actual knowledge of Defendants’ falsity, the PSLRA safe harbor
5 provision protects these Statements. *Id.* at 18–19.

6 The PSLRA’s safe harbor provision generally exempts a forward-looking statement, which
7 is “any statement regarding (1) financial projections, (2) plans and objectives of management for
8 future operations, (3) future economic performance, or (4) the assumptions underlying or related
9 to any of these issues.” *Police Ret. Sys. of St. Louis v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc.*, 759 F.3d 1051,
10 1058 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). The PSLRA shields the forward-looking statement if it is
11 either “accompanied by meaningful cautionary language” or “made without actual knowledge” of
12 falsity. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1); *Wochos v. Tesla, Inc.*, 985 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 2021). To
13 be meaningful, the cautionary language must have “identified important factors that could cause
14 actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement” and “must have
15 consisted of non-boilerplate warnings that were tailored to the forward-looking statements.”
16 *Zaghian v. Farrell*, 675 F. App’x 718, 719–20 (9th Cir. 2017). “[W]here defendants make mixed
17 statements containing non-forward-looking statements as well as forward-looking statements, the
18 non-forward-looking statements are not protected by the safe harbor of the PSLRA.” *In re Quality*
19 *Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 865 F.3d 1130, 1142 (9th Cir. 2017).

20 Here, Defendants do not appear to contest how each of the challenged growth and demand
21 Statements is specifically forward-looking, other than pointing to boilerplate warnings used in
22 SEC filings or earnings calls, or arguing that Plaintiffs are cherry-picking words to make
23 statements seem present-tense. *See* ECF 104, Exhibit 2 at 4; Exhibit 3 at 8, 10–11, Exhibit 4 at 5;
24 Exhibit 5 at 9, 11; Exhibit 6 at 4; Exhibit 7 at 8, 10; Exhibit 9 at 5; Exhibit 10 at 8, 10–11; Exhibit
25 11 at 5; Exhibit 12 at 9–11; Exhibit 13 at 9, 11; Exhibit 14 at 4; Exhibit 15 at 5; Exhibit 16 at 8,
26 10; Exhibit 18 at 6; Exhibit 19 at 8–9, 11; Exhibit 20 at 4; Exhibit 21 at 3; ECF 110 at 6–7.
27 Moreover, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiffs are merely cherry-picking words. Statements
28 such as Statement 3 (“Our teams continue to see unabated market demand”) 6 (“Our results for

1 fiscal '22 highlight unprecedented demand for Extreme's solutions"), 11 ("it's just this very
2 evenly spread, organic growth that we're experiencing at Extreme"), 12 ("primarily due to strong
3 demand for our product") 18 ("We had a record quarter as demand . . . for Extreme Solutions has
4 never been stronger. Again, our share gains are evident by double-digit revenue growth"), 19
5 ("Our distributors give us the highest rank in the networking industry for delivering on our commit
6 dates, and this is driving demand"), 33 ("[W]e in fact grew from December, reflecting strong
7 demand"), 37 ("[W]e're seeing good demand. We're seeing double-digit growth in our weighted
8 funnel year over year"), 43 ("Extreme has never been in a more robust financial position"), 44
9 ("End customer orders remain firm and distributor orders have normalized"), 45 ("[I]n EMEA and
10 the rest of the markets, they remain very strong, and the demand in the U.S. market remains very
11 strong"), 48 ("[W]ith the momentum we are building today, we don't see a lot of change for that at
12 this moment") plainly describe existing business conditions and present fact. Moreover, because
13 the Court finds that with the absence of non-boilerplate warnings and the generalized boilerplate
14 warnings, the growth and demand Statements are not accompanied by meaningful cautionary
15 language.

16 As to backlog statements, the Court finds that they are primarily non-forward-looking
17 statements of present fact, or at minimum, "mixed statement" that are ineligible for PSLRA safe
18 harbor protection. *See* ECF 109-2, Statement 7 ("We have complete visibility into our product
19 backlog"), 9 ("the massive backlog that we've built up and the continued strength of bookings"),
20 10 ("high quality of our order backlog gives us greater visibility into the next several years and
21 increased confidence of the returns"), 15 ("The combination of our continued revenue growth and
22 record backlog gives us even greater confidence in our long-term growth outlook), 17 ("Product
23 Backlog" of \$555 million was a key driver of that "Growth"), 19 ("We have complete visibility
24 into our product backlog, the vast majority of which is comprised of orders with current delivery
25 request dates."), 23 ("[W]e built up quite a bit of backlog because of the supply chain scenario, but
26 it's all very high quality and we are very confident in the back log"), 24 ("[W]e're not seeing de-
27 books . . . we're feeling a lot of confidence in the backlog number we have."), 25 ("[W]e've been
28 underreporting our earnings . . . because we've been putting in backlog."), 30 ("The majority of

1 our backlog consists of the latest generation universal products.”), 34 (“[W]e remain confident in
2 the revenue outlook for Q4 as supported by our strong funnel of opportunities, our product log”),
3 38 (“As far as visibility, we have our backlog . . . between the backlog and the deferred revenue
4 that we will recognize over time, we have really good, probably better than ever visibility into
5 what we’re going to achieve through the next fiscal year.”), 41 (“we have excellent visibility into
6 our backlog. If I think about the question of double ordering or triple ordering . . . [t]hat is not
7 happening, that’s not a phenomenon we see at all. . . . it’s not cancelable. These are real projects
8 that we see. And so I would say the vast majority of our backlog is related to this kind of end user
9 demand project-based business and we don’t see double ordering.”), 44 (“We have the benefit of a
10 healthy backlog of customer orders with request dates that spread fairly evenly through the end of
11 our fiscal year.”), 47 (“We feel good about the level of backlog we have. For instance, it’s
12 primarily, I’d say, 90-plus percent is all end customer orders at this point. And so the distribution
13 orders that we had in the past have basically worked themselves through the system, especially
14 with supply chain getting better.”), 49 (“We continue to have a healthy customer order backlog
15 with clear visibility to order with specific customer request dates through the balance of our fiscal
16 year.”), 50 (“We continue to have a healthy customer order backlog with clear visibility to order
17 with specific customer request dates through the balance of our fiscal year.”), 52 (“[O]ur backlog
18 as it relates to distribution has normalized, but we still have a fair amount of customer backlog
19 that’s out there.”), 54 (“And I think the channel is very healthy because the channel is digesting all
20 this backlog that is being release.”) Even if they are arguably forward-looking, backlog
21 represents “a snapshot of how much work the company has under contract right now,” and
22 backlog statements describe the present rather than looking ahead. *Berson*, 527 F.3d at 990 (9th
23 Cir. 2008); *see* Statements 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, 16, 18, 20, 21, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 43,
24 46, 47, 48, 49.

25 Accordingly, the challenged growth and demand Statements and backlog Statements are
26 not protected by the PSLRA safe harbor.

27 **v. The Court declines to determine the actionability of SOX certifications.**

28 Defendants also contend that, because Plaintiffs still fail to allege falsity, these challenges

1 fail as well. ECF 104 at 19. Separately, Plaintiffs’ addition to certain revenue statements fails
2 because they fail to allege that any revenue reporting was false. *Id.*

3 Since the Court finds that SAC adequately alleges the falsity of the challenged Statements,
4 which are also actionable, the Court declines to determine whether SOX Certification itself is
5 actionable.

6 **C. Scienter**

7 In the previous order, the Court did not reach analyzing this element because Plaintiffs
8 failed to allege falsity in the FAC. Now that the Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged
9 falsity in the SAC, the Court will assess a strong inference of scienter under the holistic review
10 and core operation doctrines.

11 **i. Under holistic review, the SAC creates a strong inference of scienter.**

12 Defendants contend that the “SAC does not state facts particular enough to raise a strong
13 inference of conscious or reckless disregard” and claimed that Defendants’ alternative
14 explanations that Defendants altered their strategy in response to an unprecedented supply chain
15 crisis and tried to keep investors informed the entire time are more plausible. ECF 104 at 19.
16 Specifically, Defendants claim that the Defendants did not benefit from the alleged fraud and the
17 SAC is still short of identifying “any motive for Defendants to commit fraud” and that FE-1’s
18 notes show a general corporate desire to “meet analysis market expectations” in response to a
19 supply-chain crisis and therefore are insufficient to establish a strong inference of scienter. *Id.* at
20 19–20. Further, Defendants claim that because Meyercord’s shareholdings increased during the
21 Class Period, this heightens the innocence inference. *Id.* at 19.

22 Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs’ boilerplate allegations about public statements,
23 internal reports, and meetings fail to establish a strong inference of scienter. *Id.* at 21. Defendants
24 add that general claims about Defendants’ “visibility into the backlog” are not actionable
25 corporate puffery without evidence that they “closely monitored contracts” or “received specific
26 information about those contracts.” *Id.* Defendants also assert that management’s alleged receipt
27 of unspecified weekly or monthly internal reports is insufficient to infer scienter. *Id.* at 22.

28 Defendants also argue to discredit many other FEs by stating that they “are low-level

1 employees who never interacted with Defendants and thus lack personal knowledge of
2 Defendants’ decision-making to show scienter.” *Id.* at 20. FE-1 was inconsistent for claiming
3 Defendant Brown avoided written records while elsewhere citing a June 2022 email Brown
4 authored, FE-2 failed to specify when alleged conversations with Meyercord took place or what
5 they specifically discussed, and FE-7’s expressions of concern about the internal backlog hedge
6 figure “speaks more to a good-faith difference of opinion than scienter”. *Id.* at 20–22. Defendants
7 raise that Extreme’s alleged retaliatory culture fails to connect any individual Defendants to
8 support scienter. *Id.* at 22–23.

9 The Court must credit all of FE’s accounts at this stage as any disputes regarding reliability
10 or consistency “must at least await discovery.” *Berson*, 527 F.3d at 985. Taking allegations in the
11 SAC true, several FEs reported directly to the individual Defendants or provided first-hand
12 accounts of their involvement. ECF 95 ¶¶45, 47, 206, 278–84. The Court previously found that
13 “FE-7’s pre-Class Period allegations are reliable to provide what Defendants knew during the
14 Class Period[.]” Order at 21. The SAC now clarifies that FE-7’s allegations concerning the ELT
15 Meeting occurred during the Class Period. ¶282. Because the individual Defendants are “on
16 direct notice” of and “directly informed of the issues” underlying the allegations, this naturally
17 establishes a “strong” inference of scienter. *See SEB Inv. Mgmt. AB v. Wells Fargo & Co.*, 742 F.
18 Supp. 3d 1003, 1021 (N.D. Cal. 2024).

19 The Court also finds that Plaintiffs corroborate their allegations with particularized
20 pecuniary motives. The SAC details that Defendants’ motive exists through their access to real-
21 time sales metrics, including Defendant Brown specifically stating that there were “Lots of eyes
22 on this backlog process – it’s updated all the way up to Ed [Meyercord].” ECF 95 ¶ 328. The
23 SAC identifies specific reports and databases, such as Clari and Salesforce, which FE-5 confirms
24 senior executives reviewed “as if Meyercord is reading them.” *Id.* ¶¶241–43, 516–31. When
25 statements exist regarding reports generated by software that are available to executives who
26 practice continual monitoring of such reports, scienter is supported. *See Quality Sys.*, 865 F.3d at
27 1145. The SAC identified that Defendants had a pecuniary motive for increasing both the
28 Extreme’s stock price and revenues in the short term, and Defendants Meyercord, Thomas, Tate,

1 and Rhodes received significant bonuses through the executive compensation program, where
 2 Meyercord alone earned over \$1.1 million in cash in FY 2023 and his share acquisitions resulted
 3 from derivative conversions rather than open-market purchases. *Id.* ¶¶572–82. Therefore, the
 4 scienter is further supported as defendants “were motivated to inflate [the company]’s “financial
 5 results and stock prices because their eligibility for stock options and executive bonuses were
 6 based principally on the company’s financial performance.” *No. 84 Emp.-Teamster Joint Council*
 7 *Pension Tr. Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp.*, 320 F.3d 920, 944 (9th Cir. 2003); *see Lamartina v.*
 8 *VMware, Inc.*, 2023 WL 2763541, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2023) (finding that increase in
 9 holdings as a result of compensation rather than purchase supports an inference of scienter).

10 Under holistic review, even if individual allegations may be insufficient, the Court finds
 11 that their collective weight creates a strong inference that outweighs the competing innocent
 12 inferences.

13 **ii. The core-operations doctrine supports a strong inference of scienter.**

14 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ reliance on the core-operations doctrine also fails because
 15 the SAC lacks specific admissions by Defendants of “detailed involvement” or witness accounts
 16 demonstrating that “Defendants participated in creating false reports.” ECF 104 at 23. Moreover,
 17 Defendants contend that a large backlog is not a “rare circumstance” that would make it “absurd”
 18 to suggest management was unaware of its detailed data, and the decision to stop reporting the
 19 backlog is attributable to “many potential reasons” unrelated to fraud.” *Id.* at 23–24.

20 Plaintiffs counter that the core-operations doctrine reinforces the inference of scienter
 21 because it would be “absurd [] to suggest that C-Suite officers responsible for revenue and backlog
 22 reporting were unaware of [] the widespread channel stuffing [] that affected Extreme’s most
 23 important distributors [which] collectively accounted for more than 50% revenues.” ECF 109 at
 24 21. ¶¶ 62–63, 206.

25 Here, the Court finds a strong inference of scienter under the core-operations doctrine as
 26 well. The core operations doctrine “relies on the principle that ‘corporate officers have knowledge
 27 of the critical core operation of their companies.’” *Plumbers & Pipefitters Loc. Union #295*
 28 *Pension Fund v. CareDx, Inc.*, 2025 WL 556283, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2025). The

1 individual Defendants must have known about the backlog orders because of their devastating
2 effect on the corporation's revenue. *See Berson*, 527 F.3d at 987. Considering Defendant
3 Brown's description of "lots of eyes on this backlog process" and FE-5's statement that senior
4 executives reviewed real-time databases like Clari and Salesforce, ECF 95 ¶¶242–43, 328, along
5 with the direct warnings to the ELT and the "culture of secrecy and fear", *id.* ¶¶584-600), the core
6 operations doctrine offers a strong inference of scienter. *See State Tchrs. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v.*
7 *ZoomInfo Techs. Inc.*, No. 3:24-CV-05739-TMC, 2025 WL 3013683, at *23 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 28,
8 2025) ("[T]he core operations doctrine and the statements by Individual Defendants suggesting
9 they closely monitored company data support an inference of scienter.").

10 Accordingly, the Court finds that the SAC alleges plausible motives of Defendants and
11 creates a strong inference of scienter under the holistic review and core operation doctrine.

12 **D. The SAC plausibly alleges loss causation through sequential disclosures.**

13 Defendants argue that the SAC fails to establish "a causal connection between the material
14 misrepresentation and the loss" because the five alleged partial disclosures (January 25, 2023,
15 August 24, 2023, November 1, 2023, January 8, 2024, and January 31, 2024) did not reveal any
16 "illicit channel stuffing, manipulative sales and inventory practices, or the true nature of the
17 backlog." ECF 104 at 24. Instead, Defendants contend that the stock drops show the market
18 "reacting to reports of the defendant's poor financial health generally and changing market
19 conditions, changing investor expectations, or other unrelated factors, not any "revelation of
20 fraudulent activity." *Id.* Plaintiffs contend that these five disclosures revealed new facts that
21 rendered Defendants' prior statements false or misleading, causing a total of 60 percent decline in
22 the stock price. ECF 109 at 23.

23 The SAC alleges that the January 25, 2023 disclosure reported that Defendant Thomas had
24 resigned as CFO and that the backlog had fallen, causing a 15 percent decline in the share price.
25 ECF 95 ¶¶ 353–55. The August 24, 2023 disclosure revealed that the backlog had fallen again,
26 causing a 9 percent decline in the share price. *Id.* ¶¶ 357–59. The November 1, 2023 disclosure
27 revealed that Extreme would discontinue reporting the current backlog figure on a quarterly basis,
28 causing an 18 percent decline in the share price. *Id.* ¶¶ 361–65. The January 8, 2024 disclosure

1 revealed that Extreme expected to fail to meet the guidance because of channel digestion issues,
 2 causing a seven percent decline. *Id.* ¶¶ 366–69. The January 31, 2024 disclosure revealed a
 3 decline in revenues attributable to “continued channel digestion and elongated sales cycles.” *Id.*
 4 ¶¶ 370–72. This disclosure further informed that Extreme’s distributors had lowered inventory
 5 purchases, prompting a reduction in channel inventory by \$40 to 50 million in the third quarter to
 6 address the channel digestion issue, causing a 24 percent stock decline. *Id.* ¶¶ 373–76.

7 Loss causation is the “causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the
 8 loss.” *Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo*, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005). To properly plead loss causation,
 9 the complaint “must allege particularity facts plausibly suggesting that a corrective disclosure
 10 revealed . . . the truth concealed by the defendant’s misstatements and that disclosure “caused the
 11 company’s stock price to decline.”” *Espy v. J2 Glob., Inc.*, 99 F.4th 527, 540 (9th Cir. 2024)
 12 (quotation altered and citation omitted). “Because loss causation is simply a variant of proximate
 13 cause, the ultimate issue is whether the defendant’s misstatement, as opposed to some other fact,
 14 foreseeably caused the plaintiff’s loss.” *Mineworkers’ Pension Scheme v. First Solar Inc.*, 881
 15 F.3d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).

16 Here, the Court finds that the SAC plausibly pleads loss causation with particularity facts
 17 suggesting that the five disclosures revealed the truth concealed by Defendants’ alleged
 18 misstatements and caused sequential stock drops. Defendants rely on *Loos v. Immersion Corp.*,
 19 762 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 2014), to argue that disappointing earnings results are insufficient.
 20 However, the Court is not persuaded. Unlike *Loos*, where the disappointing earnings results
 21 themselves were solely at issue, 762 F.3d at 887–88, the SAC reveals more than simply
 22 disappointing earnings to show the connection of implementation of Defendants’ illicit channel
 23 stuffing and manipulative business revenue, such that the decline in revenue is evident once
 24 Extreme’s distributors and partners cannot take more inventories. Furthermore, changing market
 25 conditions or other unrelated factors would not prevent Plaintiffs from proving loss causation with
 26 respect to these disclosures. *See First Solar Inc.*, 881 F.3d at 754 (“A plaintiff may also prove loss
 27 causation by showing that the stock price fell upon the revelation of an earnings miss, even if the
 28 market was unaware at the time that fraud had concealed the miss.”); *York City. on Behalf of Cty.*

1 of *York Ret. Fund v. HP Inc.*, 738 F. Supp. 3d 1182, 1216 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (finding that loss
2 causation is sufficiently demonstrated through inventory corrections and revenue decline, along
3 with the subsequent drop in stock price, even though the illicit scheme was not known at the time).

4 Accordingly, the SAC adequately alleges loss causation.

5 **E. The SAC adequately alleges scheme liability and Section 20(a) claims.**

6 Defendants contend that the SAC fails to allege a scheme liability claim under Rule 10b5
7 because “neither Plaintiffs’ channel-stuffing nor their backlog theory involves any deceptive act
8 that Defendants engaged in for the principal purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of
9 fact and Plaintiffs’ failure to plead scienter and loss causation is similarly fatal to their scheme
10 liability claim.” ECF 104 at 25. Plaintiffs counter that the SAC adequately alleged the deceptive
11 conduct and note that Defendants do not challenge their control in violation of Section 20(a). ECF
12 109 at 25.

13 The Court finds that the SAC adequately alleges Defendants engaged in deceptive acts
14 under Rule 10b-5 for the reasons above. *Supra* Section B–D. Taking Plaintiffs’ allegations as
15 true at this stage, the SAC supports a scheme liability claim by describing Defendants’ effort to
16 inflate revenue and backlog by concealing manipulative sales practices. *See HP Inc.*, 738 F. Supp.
17 3d at 1207. Because Defendants do not expressly contest their control, Section 20(a) claims also
18 survive.

19 Accordingly, the SAC adequately alleges scheme liability and Section 20(a) claims.

20 **V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION**

21 For foregoing reasons, the Court **DENIES** Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Lead Plaintiffs’
22 Second Amended Complaint and **GRANTS-IN-PART** Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice
23 and Incorporation by Reference as to the existence of selected exhibits, not for the truth of any of
24 the facts asserted.

25 ECF 131 is denied as moot.

26 The Class Certification Motion is due by 4/17/2026. The Class Certification Motion
27 Hearing set for 7/7/2026 at 2:00 PM is maintained.

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The Further Case Management Conference set for 9/10/2026 at 2:00 PM in San Francisco -
Videoconference Only is maintained.

Joint Case Management Statement due by 9/3/2026.

This Order resolves ECF 104, 105 and 131.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 23, 2026


TRINA L. THOMPSON
United States District Judge

United States District Court
Northern District of California